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INTRODUCTION 
Brehm and Cohen (1962) note that commitment has two major 
theoretical functions. Of prl.mary importance is the implication 
of consonant and dissonant elements within the cognitive structure 
from which predictions about responses to new information can be 
drawn, When actions are taken which provide information dissonant 
to that held with commitment to an attitude, Festineer (1957) 
delineates severai possible modes of resolution including alteration 
of overt behavior, alteration of the environment to which dissonant 
elements correspond, or addine new elements which are consonant 
with previous information, Secondarily, commitment increases 
resistance of the cognitive elements to alteration, making some 
modes of dissonance reduction more likely than others. Dissonance 
theory holds that the element least resistant to chanee will 
define the mode of resolution (Festinger, 1957). Commitment provides 
a highly specific element in an otherwise indistinct construction 
of implied cognitions. As such it will be very resistant to change: 
•••dissonance aroused in connection with a commitment is 
likely to be reduced by change in elements other than those 
Involved in commitment, If a person chooses A of two alternatives, 
A & B, he is not likely to reduce the resulting dissonance 
by saying that his choice was wrong and that he should have 
chosen B[3rehm and Cohen, 1962, p. 9). 
The effect of commitment in the dissonance formulation is. 
essentially constrictive, reducing the number of variable elements 
and placing restrictions on the way in which other pert1nent elements 
may be changed in the course of dissonance reduction. Commitment 
is therefore seen as an anchorinf, element in the cognitive system 
from which specific effects may be predicted, As such, it occupies 
a. central role in empirical tests of dissonance theory, 
Because commitment provides relatively clear specification 
of consonant and dissonant coenitions, it also provides 
rather readily a condition under which many aspects of the 
theory can be tested. Where a person can be clearly committed 
to a given behavior or decision, information that is unRmbi~­
uously inconsistent with that commitment should creRte dissonance 
and the individual should rr.an:i.fest attempts to reduce that 
dissonance. In the absence of other forces, a. failure to find 
attempts at dissonance reduction under t.hese conditions would 
be clear evidence against the theory [Brehm and Cohen, 1962, 
p. 9]. 
In the design of empirkal t.csts, att0ntion has b'?cn e;iven to 
what behaviors constitute commitment. These tests of theory require 
unequivocal explanation in terms of the theory. Brehm arrl Cohen (1962) 
point out that many attitude chanGe paradir,ms are ambiGUOus with 
regard to the interrelationships of the variables and are consoquontly 
open to interpretation by judgemental principles as well as dissonance 
theory. Commitment clarifies these relationships in di~onance terms: 
What these studies illustrate is that when subjects com..mit 
themselves to exposure to a piece of discrepant information, 
dissonance is aroused by the inconsi5tcncv between their 
commitment behavior and ~ inttial attitude~ and not by 
the inconsistency between the communjcation and their initial 
attitudes. They can then only chanr:e their attitooes in line 
with the communication to which they have exposed themselves, 
and do so differentially, dependine on the amount of dissonance 
they have experienced., It is this sort of situation that is 
entirely closed to judgemental interpretation and rather 
unequivocally explained by the dissonance formulation [Brehm 
and Cohen, 1962, p. 11-1]. 
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Actual performance of a counterattitudinal act is then unnecessary 
to produce detectable dissonance effects whenever commitment is 
obtained·. Rather, mere commitment to such a position should be 
sufficient for dissonance arousal, with reduction following one 
of the methods predicted by dissonance theory (e.g., attitude 
shift). Empirical support is found in several forced compliance 
studies. In. Brock and Blackwood (1962) ~s in either high or low 
justification conditions were asked to commit themselves to write 
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a counterattitudinal essay by signing the title p.-1.ge. High justification 
~s were given a number of reasons to argue against their own position 
by ~. such as helping to solve social problems and aidine; in the 
advancement of science. Low justification ~s received no encourage-
ment from ~. An attitrule questionnaire was then completed before 
composing the essay, Results were in agreement with dissonance 
theory in that ~s in the low justification condition exhibited 
greater attitude shift toward the counteratt:i.tudinal position 
than those in high justification, both without performinr; the 
discrepant behavior. In Rabbie, Brehm, and Cohen (1959) a similar 
design was used in which half of the ~s received the attitude 
measure before writing a counterattitudinal essay, and half after, 
Varying conditions of inducement were employed in both groups, 
The results indicate that attitude shift occurred concomittant 
with inducement level for both groups, Both studies are in agreement 
with dissonance predictions on the basis of high or low justification, 
and demonstrate that in some form, commitment alone is capable 
of arousing dissonance in ccmjunctfon _with low task justification. 
Brehm and Cohen's (1962) assertion that commitment is in fact the 
variable that is responsibl.e for dissonance arousal is given some 
credibility but support is clouded by the presence of the traditional 
kingpin variable in dissonance theory, low justification, of which 
the Ss ~ere well aware at the time of attitude shift measurement. 
This cognitve element, the knowledge that counterattitudinal 
effort would in the future be required. with low justification, 
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is alone enough to meet theory requirements for dissonance prcxiuction 
and subsequent change, lea.vine; the only clear function of cor.imitment 
in these designs to be ~n anchoring effect.-
In order to determine the role of commitment behavior in 
its own right as a dissonance producing variable, and its consequent 
effect on-attitude change, it is necessary to delineate more clearly 
what behavior constitutes commitment. Additionally, commitment must 
be described in terms that are ame.nable to use as operational 
definitions. Manipulation as a variable would otherwlse be 
impossible. Before this can be done a distinction must be made 
between public and private commitment. 
Forced choice studies often indicate commitment as a variable 
under manipulation by presenting 2_s with discrepant information 
under high or low reinforcement for participation in the experiment 
(cf. Brehm and Cohen, 1962). Commitment is inferred by the act of 
S's consent to listen to such communication, or to perform a 
consonant or dissonant act. While in agreement with dissonance 
theory, such.commitment is ambiguous. In a study by Kiesler, Pallak 1 
and Kanouse (1968) the investigators describe their commitment 
manipulation as ''varied by telling the subject that the speech, 
which advocated. a position consistent with the subject's own, 
would be ma.de public or remain anonymous[p. 332]." Each§_ in the high 
commitment condition read a consonant speech (prepared. by ~) arainst 
college tuition increases. Each §_ was told his speech would 
be heard as nart of a nationwide study, that the audience 
would probably think the opinions expressed were his own, and to 
include his name, address, and age. Low commitment §_s were told 
that the tapes would be chopped up and reassembled, guaranteeing 
arlonymity. Dissonance was manipulated by providing high and low 
choice conditions with regard to participation in the counter-
attitudinal task, writing an essay favoring greater similarity 
between public and private schools (e.g., tuition increases). 
The ~s report significant differences between dissonance and control 
groups, indicating that the choice manipulation was effective. 
However, no significant effects of the commitment conditions alone 
were found (t's< 1.0); the contribution of the commitment variable 
on attitude change was in the form of an interaction with dissonance 
levels (p <.05). Low prior commitment on a related topic enhanced 
dissonance effects and attitude shift in the counterattitudinal 
direction. High commitment had the opposite effect, essentially 
counteracting dissonance. 
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The dissonance results themselves are typical of forced compliance 
studies, while the effect of commitment is notable for its apparent 
neutrality. Examination of the commitment manipulation shows it 
to be basically one of forced choice by assignment to threatening 
(nationwide audience) or non-threatening (anonymous) conditions. 
Rather than consonant commitment, the Es may have manipulated 
threats to self-esteem, resulting in differential attention toward 
the content of the prepared speeches. It is possibly the cognitive 
elements formulated in the delivery of the speech that interacted 
with the dissonance manipulation to produce the experimental 
resuits; and not the act of commitment itseif. In addition, as in 
most forced choke studies, attitude measurement was taken after 
both the commitment and dissonance manipulations, making it impossible 
to determine the effects of either alone. Conditions necessary for 
a distinction between public and private commitment did not obtain. 
The confusion rega:r:tling the conditions that constitute commitment 
characteristic of this study has been common to studies of commitment 
as a contributing variable, Due to the design of forced compliance 
or free choice, and to the indirect nature of the dissonance 
formulation itself, the generation of commitment in £s is implied 
through justification levels and the like rather than specified 
or demonstratod directly. 
The value of public commitment as a variable lies in its 
explicitness for both £and ~. Its anchoring function within the 
dissonance framework is explained by Festinger: 
The first and foremost source of resistance to chane;e for any 
cognitive element is the responsiveness of such elements to 
reality ••• Given this strong and sometil!'es over'l-:helming respon-
siveness to reality, the prob10m of changine a behavioral,:cog.:. · -
nitive element-becomes'the problem of chan5ing the behavior 
which is mapped by the element. Consequently, the resistance 
to change of the cognitive element is identical with the 
re::;fotance to change of the bAhavior refln6too by that element, 
assuming the person maintains contact with reality [ FestinF,er, 
1957, p. 25]. 
The explicitness of commitment specifies what behavior is being 
mapped, and consequently, what is likely to change as a result of 
dissonance, Private co~~itment as utilized in many experiments is 
described 6nly in terms of the behavtor:· 1t·:changes' (e.g.,~: if'"there 
is much attitude change, £must have been committed very little; 
if ~ is resistant to change, he was highly committed), Public 
commitment is overt and discrete for ~and ~' and so cannot be 
denied without altering reality, providing a variable which anchors 
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the relevant cognitive elements into a set of relatively invarian~ 
relationships until new salient information is forthcoming. 
Studies using the public commitment variable as a cognitve 
anchor within the design have confirmed its effectiveness in behavior-
mapping element change. In conformity experiments involving stimulus 
matching, commitment may be regarded as a crucial anchoring point 
in the decisional process of stimulus judgement around which other 
elements may vary (e.g., social conformity or independence; Deutch 
and Gerard, 1955; Gerard, 1963). Commitment has been treated in a 
similar manner with regard to its effectiveness on dissonance 
reduction through information seeking in both free choice (Cohen, 
Brehm, and Latan~ 1959; Adams, 1961) and forced compliance designs 
(Sears and Freedman, 1963). These examples characterize commitment 
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as an either-or decisional phenomenon fitting neatly into dissonance 
theory (Brehm and Cohen, 1962, p. 113). But recent evidence indicates 
that depicting public commitment as a single binary event is incomplete, 
and although it serves adequately as a variable within dissonance 
theory, effects on attitudes have been observed following public 
commitment other than that to which dissonance can be applied 
(Jellison and Mills, 1969; Kiesler and Sakumura, 1966). 
In their rncxiel for commitment, Kiesler_and Sakumura (1966) 
define commitment as a binding of the individual to overt behavioral 
acts, the strength of commitment being determined by a number of 
variables including the explicitness and irrevocability of the act. 
In this, and in a similar stud! (Nuttin, 1966), attitude measurement 
was taken after both commitment and performance of the consonant 
action, A more recent study (Jellison and Mills, 1969) retained 
explicit commitment but separated commitment from performance by 
interposition of the attitude measure. Jellison and Mills found 
in their first experiment, investigating the effect of public 
commitment on opinion change after forewarning of a persuasive 
attack, that §.s' private opinions became more extreme when they 
committed themselves to argue against proposals which they opposed. 
§.s were asked their-views on several educational issues, and if 
opposed to them, commitment was then obtained by getting §. to 
agree to make a tape recording of his position against two of these 
issues which he was told would be played before national audiences. 
After indicating that he would make the tape recordings each §. 
was asked to sign a release thereby firmly committing himself. 
A Likert-type opinion questionnaire was then administered, con-
taining items directly related to those on which §. had declared 
his pos:i.tion, and items of the.same type (educational issues) on 
which he was not publicly committed. It was found that §.s were 
significaatly more negative on committed positions than uncommitted 
(p <.05). In the second part of their exp~Timent (essentially a 
replication) Jellison and Mills obtained similar results. ~s were 
asked their views on two educational proposals (different from the 
first experiment), and if favorable, were asked to make a tape 
recording of them on one of the issues. Commitment was made explicit 
in a manner similar to the first experiment, signing a card declaring 
support for the proposals. Attitu:le was determined by a Likert-
type scale, as in the first experiment. Results were in agreement 
with the first experiment: after~ ·public commi tl'nent · Ss' 'opinions 
became more strongly in favor of a position they originally favored 
(F= 16.61, 1 & 19 df, p<.01). 
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The results cannot be explained in terms of dissonance in 
that Ss were not asked to provide arguments against their own 
position, nor did they receive any discrepant information or choose 
between high and low justification conditions. It is notable that 
the attitude measure was taken before the performance of any con-
sonant activity, clearly isolating commitment as the salient 
variable, Jellison and Mills suggest the possibility ••• that the 
performance of the consonant action ma:y: in some way reduce the effect 
which the commitment to perform the action has on opinions[p. Jh6]." A 
cognitive explanantion is offered for the results. Commitment 
may have increased the Ss' desire to be correct and to be certain 
of the validity of the arguments to be used in the tape recordings, 
Jellison and Mills contend that thinking of arguments in favor of 
thei.r own side and against the opposing position would cause the 
Ss to take a more extreme position. 
It has been shown that overt commitment to an act or position 
is a salient variable in attitude change both as the result of 
dissonance reduction and in designs to which dissonance does not 
apply. While it has often been used as an anchoring variable, 
commitment as a variable with: independent effects has been neglected. 
The present experiment has been designed to investigate the effects 
of public commitment in both dissonance ani non-dissonance contexts 
while eliminating much of the ambiguity of effect resulting from 
inferential methois of manipulation. 
A number of specific hypotheses were drawn for the experimental 
conditions designed to meet these criteria. Jellison and Mills (1969) 
found that when " ••• subjects committed themselves to make a tape 
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recording of a position they favored, their private opinions 
became J!lOre strongly in favor of that position. ( p •. 345]." An 
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experimental condition, Commitment Only-Consonance (CO-C) was designed to 
correspond to the Jellison and Mills experiment, providing attitude 
measurement after overt commitment to a consonant position, but 
before performance of the committed. act. It was predicted that 
within CO-C a significant amount of attitude shift toward the 
extreme of the position originally held would be shown between 
the attitude measures (a Pretest~ taken before commitment, and a 
Posttest, taken after). A second consonance condition, Commitment 
with Argument-Consonance ( CA-C), differed only from the first in 
that attitude measurement is preceded by both commitment and 
performance of the argument. Predicting from Jellison and Mills' 
speculations, CA-C would show positive change between the Pretest 
and Posttest, but significantly less than CO-C. These results would 
imply that performance of a consonant ·action reduces ··the effect 
of commit~ent on attitude, possibly through the presence of competing 
information ~may cognize while formulating the argument. 
Rabbie, Brehm, and Cohen (1959) suggest that there may be 
two ways to reduce dissonance resulting from the decision to argue 
a discrepant position: " ••• once the indivdiual has made the decision 
to take the discrepant stand, the ensuing dissonance can be reduced. 
by attitude change 2!. by actually verbalizing the stand. To the 
extent that he does one, he need not do the other (p. 414 ]."The present 
dissonance· manipulation will provide exactly these conditions. In the 
first dissonance condition, Commitment Only-Dissonance (CO-D), the 
Posttest will take place after a discrepant stand had been committed, 
but before verbalization of that stand, The second dissonance 
condition, Co;nmitment with ArGument-Dissonance (CA-D), provides 
verbalization (the areument) before the Posttest. If change in 
CO-D were due to the effects of dissonance reduction through attitude 
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shift, ~s would become significantly more negative toward the originally 
held position. CA-D however would show no such effect, since dissonance 
reduction would have taken place before attitud.e measurement. It was 
predicted, then, that CO-D would be more·negative ihan CA-D, reflecting 
the effects of dissonance reduction throueh attitude shift .QE. verbalization 
in response to the same dissonance-producing conditions. 
In addition to a check on temporal factors the Control condition 
will provide information in two areas. Tho items used in the investigation 
are themselves controversial topics: events in the news during the 
course of the experiment could conceivably inf1.uence the responses of 
the entire sa:nple, or possibly a subgroup (one sex or the other). 
Secondly, attitude measurement will be done under very different settings 
between the Pretest and Posttest. The Control results will provide a 
check on the possible placebo effects of measurement jtself under the 
-
one to one setting of the experimental room with equipment present. 
No significant differences were predicted within the Control group. 
There is little information available in the literature on 
the functions of commitment in attitude change, and what is there, 
for the most part, is theoretical speculation about the role of 
commitment in fixing the positions of attitude elements prior to 
change. The small amount of actual data relates the act of commitment 
to gross attitude change without separating it from the attitudes 
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to which §. is committed., essentially confounding the effects of 
.either the attitude change or commitment. The primary purpose of the 
present study was therefore to determine the effects of commitment 
alone as contrasted with the customary treatment of commitment plus 
accompanying argument. Together tbese alternative treatments constitute 
the Com.~itment Factor. 
Attitude change takes place in any context under one of two 
fundamental conditions, consonance or dissonance. While it is true 
that no two attitude elements are entirely consonant £!:.dissonant 
with each other, the predomj_nant relationship between them can 
always be characterized as consonant, dissonant, or irrelevant, and 
the direction of attitude change inferred from the prevailing condition, 
In the absence of any clear data differentiating between the function 
of commitment under consonance and dissonance, the experiment was 
designed to allow a clear comparlson between the effects .of each 
commitment treatment as they occurred under both conditions. The 
second major factor was therefore the Consonance-Dissonance conditions. 
In order to determine the reliability of responses to the 
experimental items, the entire 31 item scale was administered to 
an equivalent sample of ~s in a pilot study prior to the actual 
experiment, Two Hews were found to prcxiuce about 30% of the 
responses in the desired ranges (?-9 for Topic 1, 3-5 for Topic 2). 
t These ranges were chosen to allow dete~able change in either direction. 
The final critical items are as follows: 
Topic 1 - "Federal government aid for the construction of 
schools is long overdue, and should be instituted as perm:tnent policy." 
Topic 2 - "This country should disarm regardless of whether or 
not other countries do" (see Appendix A). 
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METHOD 
Subjects. 100 §_s were chosen from the undergraduate Psychology 
classes at the University of Richmond. 
Apparatus. The experiment was conducted in a room containing two 
tables, two chairs, and a tape recorder with microphone. A stop-
watch was used to time the recordings. 
Desirn ~nd Procedure. The experiment was performed in two parts, 
following a four factbr repeated measures design with repetition 
on one factor. The first part involved the assessment of the Ss' 
attiturres before'the experimental manipulation, and was conducted 
in a group format. The second part was the experimental manipulation 
and immediate assessment of attitude change, conducted individually 
with each ~. Attitude measurement in both parts was done using a 
subform of an eleven-point Likcrt-type scale constructed for use 
in this experiment (see Appendix A). The data consisted of the 
mean values of the critical items (those to which§. was asked to 
commit himself in the experimental manipulations), and was analyzed 
by a 2x2x2x2 Analysis of Variance with appropriate post-hoc.tests 
to locate sources of variance, 
The Pretest was administered in booklet form ·•r.Hh a cover 
sheet and instructions, followed by two pages of attitude items, 
~s signed their names on the first ~age. After the booklets were 
passed out, instructions ~ere read to the group by ~. 
11+ 
Only §_s whosry response on either of the critical items was 
between three and five or seven and nine w~re ret~ine<l for the 
secona. p3:r+ .• These rane;es allowed for the detection of sir:nifi~~nt 
attHude shifts in either direction ns a rc;,ult of the manipulations. 
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§.s in the a-ppropriate ranees were randomly asslgned t.o one of the 
experimental conditions (or Control) for the second part, with the 
restriction that the male-female ratio was he1d approximately const<mt 
within each cell (Kfosler, Pallak, and Kanouse, 1968, found a consil::;tent 
difference of attitude on some topics between the sexes). 
In the second pg.rt the experimental groups ·to which §.s were 
assigned were as follows: 
CO-C: Consonance condition (commitment to argue for a topic 
which~ favored, or against a topic which !?_opposed), measurement 
of commitment effect on attitude before argument. 
CA-C: Consonance condition, measurement of commitment effect 
after argument. 
CO-D: Dissonance condition (commitment to argue against a topic 
which §.. favored, or for a topic which §.. opposed), measurement before 
argument. 
CA-D: Dissonance condition, measurement after areument. 
Control: Control condition receiving identical measurement 
conditions and instruments without commitment or argument manipulations. 
This :Paradigm was designed to control·effectively the operation 
of variables salient to the effects of commitment on attitude shift: 
CO-C provided a test on the effects of consonant public commitment 
alone in that only the declaration of commitment preceded the attitude 
change measurement (Posttest): CA-C indicated the role played by 
commitment and performance of the consonant argument, both preceding 
measurement; CO-D was designed to detect any differential effect of 
commitment alone under dissonance, and was otherwise comparable to 
CO-C: CA-D was the dissonance couterpart of CA-C, the effect of both 
commitment and argument, 
After formation of the experimental and Control groups, another 
experiment was announced to the group, described as unrelated to 
the first part, A sheet was passed around on which e_s signed up 
for individual tine periods to record arguments, The names of the 
Ss in the condition being run appeared at the top of the sheet, and 
§.s were instructed to sign only if their name was on the list. 
The purpose of this was disguised for the §_s, 
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The following instructions were read to each ~ in the experimental 
room: 
11As I explained in class, this is an experiment in the cognitive 
organization of concepts, In this part I am interested in finding out 
how people organize arguments (for/against, depending on condition) 
controversial subjects on very short notice, that is, when they have 
relatively little time to think about the arguments. The arguments 
are recorded for analysis later on by several professors and. graduate 
students of the Psychology Department, In order that we can kee~ 
track of the variables, you will be asked to record your·name before 
the argument if you agree to record !?..!!£ (stressed), Now, in order to 
completely randomize the topics, I would like you to choose one·of 
these four cards (face down on the table) • They have the topics on 
the other side. (§..chose one, E removed the rest from sight, face 
down), What topic did you get? (~showed ~the ca:rd; actually, all 
are identical). Almost everyone so far has agreed to record an 
argument, even if they did not know much about their topic. I would 
like you to sign this release allowing us to use your tape for the 
experiment, and as a record of your agreement." If§. refused, he 
was asked to take the Posttest, thanked, and allowed to leave, 
If §. agreed, he signed the sheet which states that he gives 
all rights to his tape recording to the University of Richmond 
Department of Psychology to use for scientific purposes, Verbal 
agreement and signing constituted public commitment to the topic. 
The procedure for each manipulation was as follows: 
CO-C: Before proceding with the recording §. was told that-· further 
information was needed and was given the Posttest. When fj_nished, 
S was told he had five minutes to formulate and record an argument 
consonant with his position on the topic, and the timer was started, 
Scratch paper was provided for making an outline of the argument. 
£_ was reminded. to include his name before the argument, 
CA-C: £_preceded directly from commitment to recording. Instructions 
were the same as in CO-C. When the recording was finished S was told that 
further information was needed, and the Posttest was administered. 
CO-D: The procedure was identical to CO-C but commitment and 
argument were against ~'s own position as determined by the Pretest. 
CA-D: Identical to CA-C but commitment and argument were against 
S's own position. 
Control: S entered the experimental room and received. instructions 
. - . 
"This is an experiment in the cognitive organization of concepts. 
I am interested. in finding out how people organize their ideas 
about various subjects. I would like you to read the instructions 
on this sheet (the Posttest) and then answer the questions." 
When the Post,test was com!'leted, 2_ was thankeo and allowed to leave. 
The study wa.s cond11c+.ed ·with th"' Fr0"!".est-manipulatlon-P0<>t.t,,,~+, 
design characteri:>ti~ of most, attitude change research. Accordine;ly, 
the dependent variable was the magni hide and d'irection of change 
following each Topic X Condition X Treatment.combination, .as measured 
along the eleven-point scale. In all, the design was a four factor 
2x2x2x2 with repitition on the last factor. An Analysis of Variance 
was carried out on the raw data (the ~s' scores) to determine the 
relative influence of each of the factors across trials. It.will be 
recalled the ~s were chosen for participation in the experiment 
on the basis of their Pretest responses to one- of the two topics, 
that is, they responded within the 7-9 range for Topic 1 (schools) 
or the 3-5 range for Topic 2 (disarmament). When the data were combined 
for the final analysis tM.s arbitrary Pretest score difference,_ 
included as raw data, would have j_ndicated a significant difference 
between the Ss on the basis of the stimulus attitude when in fact 
the difference was an artifact of the design. Accordingly, each score 
of all 2_s in Topic 2 (3-5 range) was converted from its original 
value to the corresponding value in the 7-9 range to allow a non-
confounded analysis along a single scale. The choice of Topic 2 for 
conversion was also arbitrary, with the purpose of simplifyins- the 
meaning of the numerical results. Done this way, consonant change 
was indicated by the positive direction, dissonant change by the 
negative. The same factor relationships would have been obtained 
had Topic 1 been converted,1 but interpretation would have been 
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confusing because of this direction of change. fhe relative direction 
and absolute value of the scores was not altered by this procedure 
so that any variance indicated by the analysis reflected an actual 
difference between the effects of the topics on other factors. 
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RESULTS 
From Table I it can be seen that a basic hypothesis of the 
study was given some support. The significant B X C X D interaction 
(F= 6.03, 1 and 38 df, p < ,025) indicates systematic differe!lces 
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between the Commitment groups under Consonant and Dissonant conditions. 
The simple effects analysis shows' that differences between the groups 
on the Pretest (D1) were nonsignificant (Table II) demonstrating 
that the experimental manipulations were the source of the significant 
variance found between the groups at the Posttest (D2 ) level (Table 
III f F= 5. 71, 3 and 76 df, p. < • 00 5). T-tests bet ween the Post test 
means (Table IV) of groups CO-C and CA~ (C at,B1) demonstrated 
the significantly greater effect of Commitrn9nt with Argument on 
consonant attitude change (tobs= 3,94, 38 df, p <.001). However, 
the difference between the Dissonance groups was nonsignificant. 
Thus, the simple effects analysis of the B X C X D interaction 
clearly disconfirmed the hypothesized function of commitment as a 
factor capable of producing attitude change by itself. The superiority 
of Coritmitment with Argument was only clear, however, under Consonant 
conditions, perhaps indicating a difference in the basic function of 
commitment between Consonance and Dissonance. But inspection of 
Figure 1 shows that the same pattern of relationships was obtained 
for both Consonance and Dissonance groups, implying the difference 
is one of magnitude only. Post-hoc tests were conducted on the 
Pretest-Posttest data to assess the effects of the manipulations 
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TABLE I. SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
Source SS df ~ F 
Total 407.77 159 
Between 232. 75 79 
A (Stimulus) 11.37 1 11.37 4.55 <.0.5 
B (Consonance/Dissonance) 6.39 1 6.39 2.56. ns 
c (Com.Only/Com. Argument) 4.22 1 
AX B 2.17 1 
A X C 10.68 1 10.68 4.27 <.05 
BX C 16,92 1 16,92 6.77 <.025 
AX BX C .72 1 
Error between 180.28 72 2.50 
Within Subjects 227.49 80 
D (Trials) 5,62 1 5,62 2.36 ns 
AX D 5.30 1 
BX D 14.42 1 il~.42 6.06 <.05 
C X D 9.05 1 9.05 3.80 ns 
AX BX D .30 1 
AX(}XD .93 1 
BX C X D 14.35 1 14.35 6.03 <.02.5 
AXBXCXD 6.13 1 6.13 2.58 ns 
Errorwithin 171.39 72 2.38 
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TABLE II. srvrr.E EFFP.r.TS-G?OUPS AT D1 (T'~.F1'EST) 
Source SS df ms F l?. 
T9tal 281+3 .1 79 
Between groups ,66 J .22 .31 ns 
Error 'th' wi in groups 53,54 76 
TABLE IIT. SIMPLE: E~FIBCTS-GROUPS AT D2 (POSTTE:ST) 
Source 
Total 
Between Groups 
Errorwithin groups 
SS 
347.95 
64.05 
283.90 
df 
79 
3 
76 
ms 
21.35 
3.74 
23 
F 
5.71 <.005 
24 
TABLE IV. PPET~ST AND POSTTSST t-lEA!;S OF EXPERIHENTAL GROUPS 
Pre (D1) Post (D2) Mean Diff. t values(Post) 
Com. Only 8,30 7,45 ,85 
Consonance 3,94 (p<.001) 
Com./Argument 8,20 1.30 
Com, Only 8.5.5 
Dissonance ,67 (ns) 
Com./Argument 8.3.5 1.10 
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FIGURE 1 , ' HEANS OF EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS 
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within each e;roup (Table V), The results further support, the notion 
that Commitment with Argument is more effective tharr Commitment Only 
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in that no significant change was observed within the Commitment Only 
groups, but CA-D e_s did show significant negative change after deliver-
ing the argument (p<.05). The pattern evident from the results shows a 
similarity in the function of commitment under both Consonance and 
Dissonance, but also indicate the Dissonance effect is somewhat 
reduced in magnitude, 
Table I also shows an unexpected significant A X C interaction 
(P-= 4,09, 3 and 76 df, p <.05). An analysis of Commitment levels 
by Topic (Table VI) shows the difference between groups to be signif-
icant (F= 3,05, 3 and 76 df, p <.05). Simple effects t-tests were 
then done in order to differentiate between the effectiveness of the 
Commitment treatments for each stimulus attitude (Table VII). 
No significant differences in the relative effectiveness of either 
Commitment treatment were found on Topic 1 (C at A1), but Commitment 
with Argument was found to have resulted in significantly greater 
change than Commitment Only on Topic 2 (C at A2 ; tobs= 4.03, J8 df, 
p <. 001). Figure 2 illustrates these relationships, implying that 
the process which resulted. in the greater overall effectiveness 
of the Commitment with Argument manipulation was potentiated by 
some conceptual aspect of Topic 2. 
Since the topics used as stimulus factors were current and 
somewhat controversial there was a possibility that events in the 
news might affect the ~s' attitudes as the data collection progressed, 
confounding the experimental effects. A Control group was therefore 
run for each Topic; concurrent with the other data collection, 
to ascertain the influence of current events. The Control group 
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TABLE V. EFFECT OF TRIALS BY GROUP (POST-HOC) 
Source SS df ms F :P. 
TrialsG CO C 7.22 1 roup - 7.22 3.03 <.10 
TrialsGroup CA-C 17.00 1 17.00 7.14 <.01 
TrialsGroup CO-D ?.22 1 ?.22 3.03 <.10 
Trials Group CA-D 12.10 1 12.10 5.08 <.05 
Error •thi wi n groups 171.39 72 2.38 
TABLE VI. SIMPLE EFFJ<~CTS-COMMITMENT TREATMENTS BY TOPIC 
Source 
Total 
Between [7oups 
Error ith" w in groups 
SS 
5436.00 
37.45 
310.50 
df 
79 
3 
76 
ms 
12.48 
4.09 
28 
F 
3.05 <.05 
TABLE VII. MEANS OF CO'M"BINF.D COMMIT'MF.'NT GROUFS BY TOPIC 
Commitment Only 
Commitment/Argument 
Topic 
te.22, 3&if t=4.0), J8df 
(ns) (p <,001) 
29 
30 
FIGURE 2. SIM?LE EFFE!.-CTS OF COMMITMENT AIID TOPIC 
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data could not be included in the Analysis of Variance because it 
was designed as a check on the stability of the data and not as a 
no-treatment comparison group, Control ~s were not asked to commit 
themselves, or given any dissonance-producing information, These 
procedural differences prevented. direct comparison of the Control 
and experimental groups, A t-test for related means was performed 
on the Control group data, and detected no significant differences 
for either Topic (Table VIII), 
In all the results presented a pattern of relationships 
which indicated that Commitment with Argument was more effective 
in producing attitude change than Commitment Only, that the function 
of Commitment with Argument was the same for both Consonance and 
Dissonance, but that the magnitude of change produced was lower 
under Dissonance, This magnitude d~fference was further amplified 
in the present study by one of the Topics (disarmament), suggesting 
that some cognitive factor altered the relative power of.commitment,, 
While it was not predicted that the two attitude stimuli should 
produce any differential effect, the possibility existed that the 
Ss might react to them or to the experimental situation in some 
systematic way in terms of personal involvement, effort put into 
the argument, or the quality of the argument as ~ perceived it. 
A short debriefing questionnaire was given, allowing each §. to 
estimate the influence of these factors on an eleven-point scale, 
with a final onen-ended question designed to find whether S had 
~ -
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discovered the purpose of the manipulations. None of the ~s questioned 
reported any interpretation of the experiment other than.that 
described by ~ in the instructions. Table IX summarizes the question-
naire results. This data could not be included in the main analysis 
TABLE VIII, COJli'TROL GROUP MEANS 
Topic 1 
Topic 2 
Pretest 
8,0 
4.1 
Post test 
7,8 
3.5 
Mean difference 
.2 
.6 
32 
ns 
ns 
33 
TABLE IX. QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS-RESPONSE MEANS 
Topic 1 Topic 2 
n 1 2 
.1 4 n 1 2 1 4 
CO-C 8 7.6 5.0 5.0 7.2 8 7,6 6,7 6.6 7,6 
CA-C 5 5,2 4,4 5,0 6,0 9 5.8 5.5 5.0 6.5 
CO-D 9 8,2 6.2 6,2 7,0 8 7.2 5,2 6,5 6,8 
CA-D 7 5.0 4.4 4,7 4,8 7 6,8 4,5 4,1 6,1 
since the questionnaire was introduced after the beginning of data 
collection and not all §.s were given the opportunity to respond. 
Although the number of §.s per group was the same, the number 
responding ranged from five to nine. In lieu of statistical analysis 
the questionnaire data show no apparent pattern between the Topics 
or groups, indicating no systematic bias along a particular factor. 
DISCUSSION 
The experiment sought to clarify two aspects of the attitude 
change process: a) the effectiveness of commitment itself, and 
b)'the functions of commitment under both consonance and dissonance, 
The results provided information on both of these points, and also 
indicated some effects of the conceptual properties of the attitude 
sti.mulus on the relationships between other factors, Together these 
findings illustrate the operation of several major factors in 
attitude change, 
The significant B X C X D interaction indicated that the effective-
ness of commitment varied between the Consonance and Dissonance 
conditions, The simple effects analysis showed that contrary to 
predictions, Commitment with Argument (Group CA-C) was sitrnificantly 
more effective than Commitment Only (Group CO-C, p < .001), clearly 
disconfirmtn!! comnitment itself as the factor 1'.'ebponsible for consonant 
attHude chane;e, The same pattern of results obtained for the Dissonance 
groups at a level below sirrnificance, although chane;e within the CA-D 
group did reach sign~ficance (p<,05) as did change within.the comparable 
Consonance group, CA-C (p < ,01). ·Looking at the pattern presented by 
the.commitment factors it is apparent that the results were consistent: 
the change within Commitment Only groups was of marginal significance 
(p(.10) with an identical Pretest-Posttest mean difference of .85; 
change within both Commitment with Argument groups was sie:niffoant, 
occurred in the expected directions, and differed only in magnitude, 
the Dissonance erou-p beinp; somewhat reduc~d. Thi~ implies that 
the difference between groups CO-D and CA-D djd not reach sie;nificance 
due to the lower magnitude of chant:e produced in Group CA-D, fodica.ting 
a similar function of commitment for both consonance and dissonance, 
but that the power of the experimental manipulation was reduced by 
some factor unique to dissonance. 
Since the main thrust of the study was to isolate commitment 
as a factor, the Commitment Only manipulation was comprised of task 
instructions and exposure to the attitude stimulus, followed by 
the commitment act itself. As was shown, this produced only marginal 
results. The Commitment with Argument treatment included task 
instructions, exposure to the stimulus, and commitment, followed 
by delivery of the argument. This treatment therefore consisted of 
many more cognitive elements and processes preceding the attitude 
measurement than the Commitment Only treatment;. The pattern of 
significant results therefore indicates the commitment difference 
was due to something occurring during formulation and delivery of 
the argument. It follows that the magnitude difference found 
between the Consonance-Dissonance conditions also had its origin 
in these processes as a subsidiary effect. 
Change could have been due either to different processes 
occurring under each manipulation, or to a different combination 
of factors interacting within the same basic framework. The consist-
ency of the results between conditions strongly supports this second 
idea. Differences between the number and type of elements entering 
into the basic process would have resulted in varied amounts of 
change conconlant with the nature of the manipulation. Character-
ization of attitude change in these terms does not imply that 
it is a fixed stimulus-processing program which passively adjusts 
§_'s attitudes to be congruent with new stimuli. Rather, the data 
suggest that a dynamic interaction takes place between new and 
pre-existing information in a continual reassessment of the relation-
ships between cognitively relevant elements. The framework of this 
process is indicated by regularities of response shift found to 
be associated wi+,h particular antecedents, lit tM_s case the components 
of the treatment levels. 
In order to specify the function of commitment as an ante-
cedent in this scheme, it is necessary to examine the processes 
which took place at each level as they relate to a general model 
of attitude change. 
Cognitive consistency or balance models of attitude change 
posit a fundamental drive towa!tl psychological agreement between 
all cognitive elements of which a person becomes aware through stimuli 
impinging from the environment. The resolution of inconsistency in 
this model usually takes the form of the addition or averaging of 
new information with old to arrive at a balance between the original 
and new positions on a given attitude cluster, While complete 
consistency is rarely achieved, the balance process takes place 
to maximize agreement even if information must be distorted or 
ignored. A variety of models have been devised to account for 
behavior under specific stimulus conditions (Rokeach, 1969; Feldman, 
1968; Anderson, 1968; Cartwrif,ht anrl Harary, 1956; Osgocxi and Tannen-
baum, 1955), taking the general conceptual form 
l:NP( n~w) 
Pressure toward change = ~NF( - . l) 
· orig1na [ 1] 
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where N = the number of relevant attitude elements in each cluster 
and P = the avera,ge weight given the cluster as determined by the 
relative importance of the individual elements, The inducement to 
change an attitude position is seen to be equal to the ratio of 
new attitude elements to old, each weighted by its importance 
(adapted from Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, 1969, p. 195). In this 
model the valence of a cluster (consonant or dissonant) would not in 
itself alter the amount of change resulting from new stimuli but 
would instead. dictate the direction of change when a resolution mode 
had been determined, The addition of a large number of cognitive 
elements, of any level of importance, would then be suffi.cient to 
alter the ratio to produce detectable change, 
By characterizing the study which originally suggested the 
comnitment hypothesis in terms of Equation [1], it becomes clear 
why the present Commitment Only manipulation failed to produce 
significant results. Jellison and Mills (1969) found that. §.s became 
more extreme on several educational issues which they originally 
opposed following public commitment to argue against them, This was 
also found to occur when §.s committed themselves to argue for 
positions which they favored. There is no indication that the 
proposals used in the Jellsion and Mills study were relatively more 
important to the §.s than the topics used here. The strength of 
commitment in the Jellison and Mills study was potentiated by 
virtue of the fact that it included a large number of cognitive 
elements derived from commitment to several topics simultaneously. 
In this study commitment on either topic was made to a single, 
rather specific proposition conprised of relatively few attitude 
~8 
elements. Considered according to Equation [1], the Commitment Only 
treatments added few new elements beyond the pre-existing position 
and so resulted in low inducement and questionable change. 
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It is clear from the results of the Commitment with Argument 
groups that the behavior which followed actual co~~itment was the 
source of most attitude change. Predicting from Equation [1], this 
could occuT either from a drastic increase in the importance of the 
attitude for the ~s between the time of commitment and are;ument, or 
from the introduction of many more elements than were present in the 
Commitment Only groups. The first possibility is given initial support 
by the significant A X C interaction (Table I) indicating a different-
ial effect of commitment dependent on the topic of argument. But the 
simple effects show this difference was due to the action of only one 
of the topics (disarmament) on tbe Ccrmnitrr.ent with Are;ument Ss 
which resulted in a large consonant increase in position. The 
explanation that importance increased does not account for the 
significant consonant increase which occurred for ~s who argued 
Topic 1, or for the negative change which occurred for Dissonance 
groups on both topics. It therefore seems hiehly likely that the 
significant Commitment with Argument effects were due to the addition 
of new cognitive elements during preparation and delivery of the 
argument, altering the Equation (1] ratio sufficiently to result 
in both consonant and dissonant change. 
More change resulted in Commitment .with Argument groups 
because of the many cognitions added during the argument. But the 
chanf'e within Group CA-C was of higher magnitude than that for Group 
CA-D althour.::h both were in the predicted direction. Since the location 
of significant variance within these groups was the oral argument, 
1 t is likcl:r tha·t differences between them also or113inated. there. 
The difference lies along the Consonance-Dissonance dimension, 
suggesting some basic properties of one not shared by the other. 
The problem can be resolved by examining the behavior of the Ss 
under each condition preceding and during the areurnent, 
In the Consonance condition §_committed himself to argue for 
something he favored (or against something he opposed). In order 
to pro:luce a convlncing are;ument in support of his position §_ then 
had to recall relevant facts, ideas, opinions, and propositions 
from memory, assemble them in a logical way, and 'Phrase them so 
that they would be both audible and underst.andable. The entire process 
required much seeking of information and quick judgement of its 
relevance to the topic and the task. §_s were often so absorbed in 
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the task that they were visibly irritated when §.announced the time 
remaining at minute intervals. ~ was therefore hishly motivated to 
actively search for support for a position in which he had sorr.e interest 
in ad.di tion to the commitment ma.de before the task was begun. Since 
only relevant elements in agreement with the ori~inal position were 
sought by §_, they combined additively resulting in a new position 
more extreme than the old. The process is somewhat mo:lified for 
Dissonance ~s, however. When the commitment was made to argue against 
something which ~supported (or the reverse) a slight amount of 
dissonance may have been aroused, but at a level too low to detect 
with the present design. Festinger (1957) maintains that when any 
dissonance is aroused the person will attempt immediately to reduce 
it, and if unsuccessful will at least actively avoid seeking new 
information which would increase it. Dissonance ~s were in a bind 
in this situationi they had committed themselves to a discre~ant task, 
thus preventing the reduction of dissonance through denying the rele• 
vance of the topic, and further, they were committed to producing 
information supporting it. A compromise was then necessary to minimize 
additional dissonance production while still satisfying the terms 
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of commitment. This could be done by choosing less convincing arguments 
and insubstantial facts, and relating them in a less coherent way than 
2 may have been capable of. Since the stimulus attitude against which 
the new infor11V~tion was compared was the· same as that for Consonance 
groups, the effect of the dissonance arguments was relatively reduced, 
reflecting the Ss' need to satisfy two incompatible tasks simultan-
eously. No such incompatibilty occurred under Consonance and so 
greater attitude change occurred, 
Direct support for this explanantion would come from the tape 
recordings made by the 2_s, As determined by independent raters the 
arguments of Consonance 2.s should be judged to be more convincing, 
coherent, and well-supported than those of Dissonance 2s, and 
objectively be longer in length and contain more facts and opinions, 
This leads also to the implication that if it were possible to equate 
the arguments for quality and objective criteria, no differences 
would be found in the magnitude of change produced by either Consonance 
or Dissonance, 
Although the shift within the Commitment Only groups only 
approached significance (p <,10) it is worthwhile to examine the 
results presented by them in relation to the overall pattern of 
significant effects. Comparing between commitment levels, Figure 1 
shows that the nerformance of the Dissonance groups (CO-D and CA-D) 
is nearly parallel. Complete symmetry of the commitment effect would 
require the same parallel relation~hip bet~enn the sirnificant CA-C 
group and nonsi5nificant CO-C, but this did not occur. The trend of 
CO-C was reversed toward thP. dissonant direction, arrl wa~ the only 
scores of all ten ~s in Group CO-C revcalf'd that nHhnueh only one 
changed in the expected direction, six chan~cd their position two 
or less points with three of these shewing no chan~c at all. The 
troublesome reversal is due to three Ss who reversed. their positions 
between measures by three, four, and five points respectively. Only 
one §. on Topic 2 cha.need negatively as much as three points. With no 
more evidence than this to explain n m::i.rr;inal trend it is reasonable 
to conclude that the CO-C reversal was a chance occurrence or subject 
error until an experiment can be designed to pursue the proble~ more 
directly. Such a study should take into account the variables of time 
between commitment and postfost, §.'s familiarity with the topic, its 
importance to §., and the clarity of the instructions. Ambieuity in 
any of these factors mie;ht have resulted in ~·s being unsure of his 
own ability to perform the task arrl resolving the possible threat by 
revising his ori~inal attitude toward a more ~eutral position, which 
would necessitate negative (dissonant) movement. This seems reasonable 
in that only four of the twenty CO-C 2,s actually moved into the true 
disagreement range (below 5 for Topic 1, above 7 for Topic 2). Also, 
Kiesler (1968) notes that in previous studies the manipulation of 
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public commitment has inadvertently resulted in dissonance as a by-
product. Commitment might also make pre-existin~ dissonance (between 
individual elements of a single attitude) more &'llient when made public. 
In either case resolution of dissonance would require negative shift, 
which would be exPCcted for CO-D Ss but not for CO-C Ss. Such dissonance 
- - -
4) 
would be masked in both Commitment with Argument F,Toups by the influx 
of new elements. This explanantion would be tenable if new data repli-
cated the post-commitment negative shift, It would then be necessary to 
devise a very homogeneous attitude stimulus to insure the independence 
of commitment and dissonance. 
It was noted above that a significant A X C interaction (F= 4.27, 
1 and 72 df, p <.05) was found to indicate a varying effect between 
the topics on the Commitment treatments. The simple effects analysis 
(Table VI) found the difference between groups to be significant 
(F= 3.05, 3 and 76 ~f, p <.05) and showed that the performance of 
Commitment with Argument ~s was significantly greater than that of 
Commitment Only ~s on Topic 2 ( t b = 4. OJ, 38 df, p < • 001). The differ-o s 
ence between groups on Topic 1 was nonsignificant. Some cognitive•pro-
perty of Topic 2 therefore increased the effectiveness of the Commit-
rnent with Argument treatment, evidently in ~s who changed in the 
consonant direction. Equation [ 1] implies this property 'was the 
importance of the attitude stimulus. Importance:as·a cognitive attribute 
of attitude has been central to discussions of attitude change and 
has been found to be a critical determinant of the relevance and 
centrality of a particular position. Applied to commitment, it has 
been shown to entirely control the power of the commitment act in 
influencing overt chanee (Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, 1969). 
Festinger (1957) delineates importance as one of the necessary ante-
cedents of dissonance, with the amount of dissonance produced varying 
directly with the importance of the obverse elements, again describing 
a power relationship. Equation [1) shows why this should be so: 
~NP describes a multiplicative relationship between the individual 
cognitive cle:::ents a~d the weight civcn ea.ch· under 2_'n own value 
system, the products of which are combined additively. The net effect 
(power) of only a few elements is very ereat if held to be central by 
2_; if they border on irrelevance even a large number of inputs would 
have no actual effect. This theoretical scheme'.is not as specu1attve 
as it might seem. Stimuli of all kinds are perpetuall¥ bombarding 
the cognitive field, yet only a few arc deemed relevant en0uch to 
affect an exist in~ at ti tndc, ar.d even fewer r"'c;11l t in larse-sc;i1.e 
reorient~tions of an entire cluster. Otherwise the ~tability and 
dura-1:.ion of an attitude would be so low a$ to prevent measurement. 
Moreover, in tho present study a number of Ss in Topic 2 spontan-
eously commented about their personal concern over what were the 
relevant issues associated with the topic, including world peace, 
trust between nations, the historic role of the United States as a 
leader in world affairs, and the cost of the arms race. Very few 
comment$ of this type or ready areuments occurred on Topic 1 (one 
exception was an education major who had experienced problems finding 
a job because of school funding difficulties). 
F..quation [ 1] implies that the greatP.r the number of elements 
to which inportance is attached, the greater the resultant attitude 
change. Conversely, the lower the importance of the topic, the lesser 
the effect of the number of elements, whether large or small. 
Assuming Topic 2 to have been of greater importance than Topic 1, 
the qualitative results fulfill these predictions almost exactly. 
Figure 2 illustrates that Topic 2 as an attitude stimulus resulted 
in greater Posttest shift in both Commitment treatments (althou~h 
the Commitment Only mean difference is nonsignificant), while neither 
Commitment level on Topic 1 was substantially altered (mean difference 
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between treatments = .15). This pattern denotes the function of 
both importance and commitment as factors in the change process. 
It was seen that commitment itself possesses no inherent ability 
to produce change independent of its association with substantive 
attitude elements or clusters, and that the role of importance was 
one of potentiating the effects produced by the interaction of all 
other relevant factors enterine into the restoration of balance. 
Commitment to a single important issue resulted in greater shift 
than commitment to an unimportant one (Figure 2-C2 means) while 
commitment followed by many important elements resulted in greater 
change than the same factors associated with an unimportant issue 
(Figure 2-e2 means). The overriding influence of importance was 
underscored by the relative lack of movement of ~s in (unimportant) 
Topic 1 even after the inclusion of the arguments. The multiplicative 
--1perty of importance made it a critical determinant of the magnitude 
attitude change. 
Considering the role of commitment in attitude change according 
to the relationships indicated by Equation [1} it is clear why the 
main commitment hypothesis was disconfirmed. It was predicted that 
commitment to defend or attack a position on a particular topic 
would result in a more extreme position than that originally held, 
and that the addition of verbal argument following commitment would 
negate or reduce change instigated by the commitment act itself, 
under both consonance and dissonance (Jellison and Mills, 1969; 
Rabbie, Brehm, and Cohen, 1959). This was found to be incorrect, 
with only marginal shift occurring following commitment by itself, 
The difficulty posed by the discrepancy between these results arrl. 
those of Jellison and Mills is resolved. by examining the operational 
definition of commitment in each study. Jellison and Mills asked their 
§_s to agree to make a tape recording and sign a release in a way 
almost identical to that used here, but the specifics of commitment 
were ambiguous and general in that commitment. was made to an attitude 
area (education) rather than to a single topic. Measurement was made 
on related but not identical topics, further broadening the cluster 
of stimuli to which commitment was associated. By delaying measurement 
for a few minutes without any interpolated activity other than the 
related topics questionnaire, Jellison and Mills allowed their Ss 
to think about the stand they had committed. This nearly corresponds 
to the Commitment with Argument treatment used here, less the overt 
delivery of the argument. The present consonance results are therefore 
basically in agreement with the previous study in that Jellison and 
Mills failed to isolate commitment clearly and so measured the effect 
of commitment plus thinking, related to a topic area. Under these 
conditions Equation [1] would predict substantial shift. Similar 
results were predicted for dissonant commitment, and likewise, were 
d~sconfirmed. Rabbie, Brehm, and Cohen (1959) hypothesized that 
dissonance created by commitment to argue a discrepant position 
might be reduced by either attitude change or overt verbalization 
of the dissonant position. But their study failed to separate 
commitment from the dissonance-producing stimuli in that high or 
low justification was. used as the operational definition forbotn 
dissonance and commitment. The failure of the present dissonant 
commitment to produce dissonance reduction reflects the isolation 
of commitment as a· discrete act. When commitment is clarified in 
this way, it can be seen that the prediction of dissonance reduction 
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by either attitude shift or verbalization was not substantiated: 
with well-defined discrete variables, no change took place unless 
the dissonant position was verbalized. Whether any dissonance was 
created by discrepant c6rnmitment cannot be determined from the measures 
taken here; if so, it was not reduced through attitude change. 
The only dependent variable used in this study was linear 
attitude change along an arbitrary scale. This may have been a 
limitation on the value of the results. Earlier studies (Brock and 
Blackwood, 1962; Brehm and-Cohen, 1962; R~bbie, Brehm, and Cohen, 
1959), have indicated commitment to have several effects in addition 
to gross attitude shift, including cognitive anchoring, psychological 
implication, and reality testing. Measures of these functions would 
have indicated that although commitment alone did not affect overall 
attitude shift, it may have specified the relationships which did 
actually result in overt attitude change, Equation [ 1] implies that 
a single element (such as commitment) has little power to change an 
entire cluster, but that once several new (or important) elements are 
made relevant, change will occur, The distinction is between the 
qualitative and quantitative effects of commitment. While commitment 
alone may not result in measureable change it may create the conditions 
that do so by bringing previously unrelated elements into cognitive 
relevance, 
SUMMARY 
While the data do not support the original hypothesis the 
consistent pattern of significant results does suggest an alternative 
view of the role of commitment. A primary objective of the study was 
to treat commitment as a discrete independent.variable, avoiding the 
confusion resulting from inferential and partially confounded designs 
employed in most previous commitment studies, and this objective was 
achieved. Separation of commitment as a distinct variable allows 
specific inferences to be made about its function in the attitude 
change process. Kiesler (1968) summarizes the usefulness of the data: 
Commitment must be conceptually distinguished from dissonance. 
The first step (and a minim~l one) in such a distinction would 
be to indicate the conditions under which one may vary commit-
ment without affecting dissonance. Without at least this,. the 
term commitment has no conceptual status independent of that 
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of dissonance. I would argue that without the independent status, 
-the term commitment is superfluous to social-psycholoGical theory. 
One of the initial steps in making the distinction is to answer 
the question: fa commitment in and of itself motivating? I argue 
that j_t is not, If one wants to take the opposite position, he 
must clearly indicate the motivational properties of commitment 
that are distinct from those of dissonance. [Kiesler, 1968, p, 455] 
The findings agree with Kiesler's proposition: 
1) While commitment has the status of a cognitive factor, it has 
no motivating properties of its own which produce attitude change. 
Change in this experiment following commitment was shown to be 
dependent on the number and importance of cognitive elements with 
which the commitment was associated. The primary hypothesis that 
commitment would induce si91ificant attitude change was not sup-portr:d, 
arreeinc; in this respect with the results of Kiesler, Pallak, and 
Kanouse (1968) and Kiesler and Sakumura (196'6), Brehm anrl Cohen 
(1962) assert that commitment fixes tqe relationships between 
relevant cognitive elements, increasing their resistance to change 
and thereby restricting the ways in which balance may be restored, 
The data agree with this proposition in that change took place 
following both consonant and dissonant commitment, but required 
that a large number of elements be present for the shift to achieve 
significance, The function of commitment itself in this regard is 
unclear because of the lack of' a no-treatment control participating 
in the argument manipulations, Presumably such a group would have 
many more avenues of restoring balance after stimulus' input and 
would show less -conseq uent-,shift. 
2) The function of commitment (and areument) was shown to be 
the same under both consonance and dissonance, but the resultant 
amount of change under dissonance was reduced, This was seen to 
have been the result of conflicting motivations created by dissonance, 
in which ~ was at once bound by his commitment to perform the task 
and also desired to avoid the greater dissonance created by it. 
A compromise occurred which resulted in less attitude change, 
probably through ineffective information seeking. 
3) The results also provide support for general dissonance 
theory (see p. 2). As predicted by dissonance theory, unambiguous 
commitment followed by discrepant information introduced during 
the argument resulted in dissonance reduction through attitude change. 
4) The importance of the topic was found to strongly affect 
the magnitude of change prOO.uced, varying differentially with the 
number of elements present in the treatment. Iiike commitment, 
importance acted as a variable which by itself had no motivating 
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properties, but acted within the dynamic balance process to increase 
the salience of some factors and resulted in much greater overt change. 
Public commitment produced no motivation to change attitude 
positions by itself, but did bind the ~to the performance of a task 
which incorporated motivating factors. Two primary factors were found 
to be consonant or dissonant imbalance, and issue i.mportance. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A 
Two subforms of the attitude scale, composed of 62 items 
taken from three separate scales (Lerner, Pendorf, and Emery, 
1971; Comrey and Newmeyer, 1965; Kerlinger, 1963) were used, one 
for each part of the experiment (31 items). A reliability study 
was conducted on a comparable but separate population precedine 
the experiment to determine inter-form reliability and compatability 
of the items. The percentage of ~s falling into ranges acceptable 
for Part II (item mean of 3-S or 7-9) was checked, indicating 
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overall suitability of the composite scales for the experiment. 
Inasmuch as each of the original scales was designed to discriminate 
along a liberal-conservative dimension (each reporting high reliability 
figures for this: Kerlinger, split-half reliability .78, .?9; Lerner, 
Pendorf, and Emery, t-test discrimination between young and old ~s 
at p <.05 on 89.5% of the items; Comrey and Newmeyer, inter-form 
correlation = • 96), the initial reliability study was primarily 
concerned with the ability of each of the subforms to detect §.s 
along this dimension as indicated by the percentage of the sarnpTe 
that scored within the desired ranges. About 30% did so on two items 
which were then used for the main study: 
Topic 1 - "Federal government aid for the construct'ion of 
schools is long overdue and should be instituted as permanent policy." 
Topic 2 - This country should disarm regardless of whether or 
not other countries do. 
These items were shown to be almost completely uncorrelated 
(r = .03), 
1 2 
Very Strongly 
Disagree 
3 4 
APPENDIX B 
PRETEST 
5 6 
Neutral 
7 8 9 10 11 
Very Strongly 
Agree 
1. Individuals who are against churches and religions should not be 
allowed to teach in college. 
2. Laws dealing with drugs, such as marijuana, are unjust. 
3. Employers should be prevented by law from hirine; only people of 
their own race. 
4. My conscience would bother me if I killed a man in war. 
5. Laws which benefit the people are more important than laws which 
strengthen the nation. 
6. Regulation of business by government usually does more harm than 
gooi, 
7, The federal government has too much power over citizens and local 
government. 
8, Indiv:iduals. with the abi1 ity "'·nd foresight to earn and accumulate 
wealth should have the right to enjoy that wealth without government 
interference, 
9, Every child should have religious instruction. 
10, Government laws and regulations should be such as first to ensure 
the prosperity of business since the prosperity of all depends on the 
prosperity of business. 
11. Federal gove:rnment aid for the const"l'.'llction of' schools is long 
overdue, and should be instituted as permanent· pol icy .• 
12, The United n~tions should be wholeheartedly supported by all of us. 
13, Our country should prepare to employ every available weapon to 
destroy any major power that seriously attacks us. 
14. The government should guarantee every citizen enough to eat. 
15. The United States should work peacefully for a strong world governemnt. 
16. Science and society would both be better off if scientists took 
no part in politics. 
17. When something is run by the government it is apt to be innefficient 
and wasteful. 
18, There should be no lnterference with business and trarle, 
19. Our laws give too much protection to criminals. 
20. Society should be quicker to throw out old ideas and traditions and 
to adopt new thinJdng and customs. 
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21, This country should disarm regardless of whether or not other countries 
do, 
22, The United States should be willing to surrender some of its rights 
to strengthen the United Nations, 
2J, All individuals who are intellectually capable of benefit,ting from 
it should p,et college education, at public expense if necessary. 
24. True democracy is limited in the United States because of the 
priviliges enjoyed by business and industry. 
25. Universities should not oppose radical groups, but should provide 
them with the protection that others have, 
26, Funds for school construction should come from state and federal 
government loans at no interest or very low interest. 
27. If called upon to do so, a citizen should be willing to sacrifice 
his life for his country. 
28. Laws dealing with drug conviction are too harsh, 
q 
29. It is moral to flee to qnad.a to escape the draft, 
JO. Marriages between persons of different races should be socially 
acceptable. 
31, A first consideration in any society is the protection of property 
rights, 
1 2 
Very Strongly 
Disagree 
3 
POSTTEST 
5 6 
Neutral 
? 8 Q 
' 
10 11 
Very Stron~ly 
Agree 
1. The average man today is getting· less than his rightful share of 
the national wealth. 
2. A first consideration in any society is the protection of property 
rir;hts. 
3. A greater degree of governme"!"lt control over business would result 
in a weakening of this country's economy. 
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4. Some sort of Teligious education shouln be given in the public schools. 
5. Laws dealing with drug conviction are too harsh. 
6. Our laws give too much protection to criminals, 
7. When something is run by the government, it is apt to be innefficient 
and wasteful. 
8, Universities should not oppose radical groups, but should provide 
them with the same protection that others have, 
9. The government should guarantee every citizen enoueh to eat. 
10. Society should be quicker to throw out old ideas and traditions and 
to adopt new thinking arrl customR, 
11. All individuals who are intellectually capable of benefitting from 
it should eet colle13e education, at public expense if necessary. 
12, Regulation of business by government usually does more harm than goal,. 
13. Every child should have religious instruction. 
ilk, The United States should be willing to surrerder some of its rights 
to strengthen the United Nations. 
1). Federal government aid for the construction of schools is long 
overdue, and should be instituted as permanent policy. 
16. The federal government has too much power over citizens arrl local 
government. 
17. 011r country shou1<l prepare to employ every avaHable weapon to 
destroy any major power that seriously attacks us. 
18. If c:i.11€"1 u-pon to do so, a citizen should be willing to sacrifice his 
life for his country. 
19, Science and society l~:rould both be better off if scientists took no 
pg.rt in politics. 
20, Government laws and regulations should be such as to first ensure 
the prosperity of business since the prosperity of all depends on 
prosperity of business, 
21. Laws which benefit the peo~le are more important than laws which 
strenethen the nation. 
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22. The United States should work peacefully for a strong world government, 
23, Individuals with the ab3lity and foresiGht to earn and accumulate 
weal th should have the right to enjoy t.hat weal th without, r;overnment 
interference and refrnlation. 
24, There should be no government interference with business and trade. 
25, This country should disarm regardless of whether or not other countries 
do. 
26, Funds for school construction should come from state and federal 
government loans at no interest or very low interest, 
27. The United Nations should be whol~heartedly supported by all of 
us, 
28, Tru~ democracy is limited in the Unieted States because of the 
priviliges enjoyed by business and industry, 
29, Large fortunes should be taxed fairly heavily over and above income 
taxes, 
JO, Employers should be prevented by law from hiring only people of 
their own race. 
31, The gradual social ormership of industry needs to be encouraeed if 
we are ever to cure some of the ills of society, 
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UA!.E ~---------~--~------~~------
1) Indicate the aliiOu..1t of real of'fort you put into fornulntint; your 
3 5 6 7 8 
very li t·;ie 
2) How convincing do you t:-.i!llc your a.r5w:tcnt. is? 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Not convincin:; at all 
5} Hou 't·.>ell thou;;!!t out is your ar!;UJllent? 
l 2 3 ~ 5 6 7 
-
Poorly 
8 
9 10 11 
Vecy i.1Uch 
9 10 11 
Very convincinr; 
9 10 11 
Vory •roll 
4) Ineicate hoi7 L'lUCh pcrsori.al involvcncnt you felt >rhilc £or::llllatil15 and 
rccordin~ your ar;;uracnt. 
i 2 s 4 s · 6 1 a 9 lo 11 
:£.To involvemen·i:; Very mucn involvement 
5} Do you think you understand T:hat tho exporiracn·t is about? • 
------
If so~ explain briefly: 
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